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I. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, on January 17, 1989f the Court granted David 
Madsen's petition for interlocutory appeal. David Madsen 
appeals an interlocutory order of the Third Judicial 
District Court dated December 2, 1988 granting United 
Television, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment. In 
the order the court entered judgment in favor of United 
Television, Inc. on plaintiff's first cause of action which 
alleged defendants acted negligently in defaming plaintiff. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is a Salt Lake City policeman-plaintiff in a case 
against a media defendant alleging he was defamed in news 
stories broadcast by the media-defendant concerning the 
policeman's performance of his official duties a public 
official within the meaning of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and also a public figure 
within the meaning of Gertz v. Robert Welchf Inc.f 418 U.S. 
323 (1974)? 
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III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
U.S. CONST. Amend I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, SECTION 1 
(Pertinent Part) 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
. . . to communicate freely their thoughts, and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, SECTION 15 
(Pertinent Part) 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. On March 24, 1988, David 
Madsen ("Madsen"), a Salt Lake City police officer, filed a 
verified complaint against United Television, Inc. ("United 
Television") and John Harrington for defamation. 
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(R. 2-7). The verified complaint alleged that KTVX 
Television, Channel 4, which is owned by United Television, 
defamed Madsen during certain news broadcasts reporting on a 
shooting incident which occurred on October 26, 1987 in 
which Madsen shot and killed Clemente Garcia. (R. 2-7, & 
113). 
B. Proceedings Below. On October 3, 1988, United 
Television filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
plaintiff's first cause of action. (R. 221-22). In the 
first cause of action, Madsen alleged he was a private 
person and United Television negligently defamed him. (R. 
2-7). United Television claimed it was entitled to summary 
judgment on the first cause of action because the statements 
about Madsen and the incident are subject to a qualified 
privilege under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and under the Utah Constitution , Art. I § 
15. (R. 221-243). The second cause of action, also for 
defamation, alleged alternatively that if Madsen was a 
public official or a public figure, that United Television 
acted with actual malice. The motion did not address the 
second cause of action. 
Argument was heard by the court on November 28, 
1988. On December 2, 1988, the court issued an order 
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granting United Television's motion for partial summary 
judgment finding that Officer Madsen is a public official 
within the meaning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivanf 376 
U.S. 254 (1964) and also a public figure within the meaning 
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (R. 304-
05). The court held Madsen is required to prove that United 
Television acted with actual malice in order to recover on a 
defamation action against the television station. (R. 304-
05). 
C. Statement of Facts. On October 26, 1987, 
Madsen was involved in a shooting "incident" on a public 
street in Salt Lake County in which he shot and killed 
Clemente Garcia ("Garcia"). (R. 224). Early in the evening 
of October 26, 1986, Garcia's wife had called the police 
reporting a dispute with her husband and requesting police 
assistance. As the police arrived at Garcia's home, he 
drove away in his truck. A car chase through the streets of 
Salt Lake County followed and ultimately involved at least 
fourteen police cars. Madsen, who was not one of the 
officers responding to the initial call, eventually joined 
the chase in Emigration Canyon. Madsen brought the chase to 
a halt when he blocked the road, forcing Garcia to stop. 
When Garcia stepped out of his car carrying a weapon, he was 
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immediately confronted by Madsen, who had placed himself 
openly on the roadf ignoring the need for protective 
cover. When Garcia, who was armed, turned towards Madsenf 
Madsen opened fire. Garcia was killed. When Madsen started 
shooting, other police officers who were in the approximate 
line of fire had to seek protection from Madsen's bullets. 
(R. 226-27). 
The facts and circumstances surrounding this 
tragic shooting were presented to the public by KTVX 
Television Channel 4 during regular evening and nightly 
news broadcasts. As a result of information supplied by 
other police officers and private citizens, KTVX also 
broadcast reports on Madsen1s questionable actions 
immediately preceding the shooting and his past performance 
record as a police officer. All the news coverage focused 
on the killing of Garcia and the role Madsen's history of 
abusive conduct might have played in that shooting. None of 
the stories contained any information about Madsen's 
personal life apart from his performance as a public law 
enforcement officer. (R. 227). 
Madsen commenced this defamation action against 
United Television claiming he was defamed by the news 
broadcasts. He does not contend that United Television 
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broadcast any information about his private life. He 
alleges the defamatory information included that he "had a 
poor record with the police department; was in the process 
of being fired or removed from the police department; had 
acted with disregard for the safety of others and in 
violation of police standards and rules regarding the 
incident on the 26th of October, 1987; and had discharged 
his weapon on that occasion causing the death of another 
improperly and without good reason and in violation of 
established police policies in the situation as faced by 
Plaintiff." (R. 2-7, Complaint 11 5). 
Madsen complains that his reputation, including 
his reputation among his fellow police officers, has been 
damaged and "besmirched." He also claims that his "ability 
to perform his duties as a police officer have been impaired 
and his safety endangered." (R. 2-7). 
After the action was begun, United Television 
subpoenaed Salt Lake City Corporation requiring it to 
produce documents regarding the events which led to the 
death of Garcia and documents concerning Madsen's 
performance as a police officer. (R. 21-23). The City 
refused to produce the police department Internal Affairs 
documents concerning Madsen and Madsenfs personnel file, 
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claiming the documents were privileged and moved the court 
for a protective order, (R. 93-96). The City did provide 
United Television with an edited list of the formal 
complaints brought against Madsen by members of the general 
public. (R. 158-62).1 
The list revealed seventy-seven citizen complaints 
filed against Madsen with the police department's Internal 
Affairs Division. (Id.) The seventy-seven complaints 
include: "threats with shotgun/1 "police brutalityf" 
"excessive force," "officer put shotgun in face," "attempt 
to extort money from Masseusef" "assault/gun in face," 
"unnecessary roughness/rudeness," "macing of prisoner," 
"unnecessary use of service revolver," "missing property," 
and "abuse of authority/excessive force." (Id.) 
Five of the complaints were "sustained" by the 
Internal Affairs investigators. (Id.) A complaint is 
"sustained" when the investigator and the chief of police 
conclude that the event did occur and that the officer is 
either guilty of the conduct charged or guilty of some other 
x0n November 23, 1988, this Court granted United 
Television's petition for an interlocutory appeal from the 
trial court's order granting in part and denying in part the 
City's motion for a protective order concerning these 
documents. United Television's appeal brief was filed on 
July 26, 1989. 
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infraction. (R. 136). The "sustained" complaints include 
"macing a prisoner," "illegal search and entry," and 
"excessive force." (R. 158-62). 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires 
public officials in a defamation action to prove the 
allegedly defamatory statements made by a media defendant 
were made with actual malice. Because a police officer 
holds a position which is particularly governmental and 
concerns the public interest to a high degree, the courts 
have consistently held that, in a defamation action against 
a media defendant for statements made concerning a police 
officer's performance of his duties, a police officer is a 
public official under the New York Times standard. The 
stories broadcast by United Television about Madsen all 
involved his performance as a police officer. Therefore, 
summary judgment on Madsenfs first cause of action alleging 
United Television acted negligently was appropriate. 
2. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974), the Supreme Court held that those persons who have 
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either voluntarily or involuntarily attained prominence in 
the affairs of society or who have thrust themselves into 
the forefront of public controversies are "public 
figures." These public figures also must prove that a media 
defendant in a defamation action acted with actual malice. 
By his involvement in the shooting death of Clemente Garcia, 
Madsen either voluntarily or involuntarily thrust himself 
into the vortex of public interest and, thus, for purposes 
of this action, became a public figure. 
3. Under Utah law, a public interest qualified 
privilege applies to a media defendant in a defamation 
action when the alleged defamatory comments concerned 
matters of public health and safety. The tragic death of 
Clemente Garcia and the actions of Madsen as a Salt Lake 
City police officer involved the public safety and were 
matters of great public interest. Because the United 
Television news broadcasts involved a matter of great public 
interest, the comments of United Television are protected by 
the qualified public interest privilege. Because this 
privilege applies, Madsen is required to prove that United 
Television acted with actual malice. 
4. Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
have held that it is constitutionally required for the trial 
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court in the first instance to make the determination 
whether or not a plaintiff in a defamation action is a 
public official or a public figure. This determination does 
not require an extensive factual analysis when the essential 
facts concerning the plaintiff and his position in society 
are not in dispute. Because the stories broadcast by United 
Television concerned Madsen's performance as a law 
enforcement officer involved in a matter of great public 
interest, it was appropriate for the trial court to 
determine that the constitutional privileges apply to this 
instance and to grant summary judgment in favor of United 
Television on Madsen's negligence claim. 
VI. 
MADSEN IS A "PUBLIC OFFICIAL" 
The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in relevant part: "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . ." This Amendment is made applicable to the 
states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 673 U.S. 229, 235 
(1963). The First Amendment is premised on the belief that 
free and open debate on public issues must be protected from 
government interference. Similarly, the Utah Constitution 
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also protects the right of citizens "to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions . . . " Utah Const.
 f art. I, 
§ 1, and, like the United States Constitution, directs that 
"[n]o law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom 
of speech or of the press." Utah Const., art. I, § 15. 
These keystone state and federal constitutional 
provisions have served to temper the common law of 
defamation when the person allegedly defamed is a "public 
official" or "public figure," or when the plaintiff is at 
the center of a subject of great concern and interest to the 
public. In any of these instances, a plaintiff in a 
defamation action must prove (by clear and convincing 
evidence) that the allegedly defamatory statements were 
false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964). 
In the New York Times decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court revolutionized the law of defamation. Prior to that 
time, an action for defamation was based primarily on strict 
liability. Pre-New York Times, a false and defamatory 
statement was actionable even though the publisher had taken 
every reasonable measure to ascertain the truth of the 
statement, even if the statement was made about a public 
official. But New York Times established a qualified 
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privilege for media defendants in defamation actions brought 
by public officials. 
That landmark case involved an action for libel 
brought in an Alabama state court by a city commissioner of 
public affairs whose duties included supervision of the 
police department. The public official brought suit against 
the New York Times for publication of a full-page 
advertisement, purchased by the "Committee to Defend Martin 
Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South," 
which described the Montgomery police's maltreatment of 
black students protesting segregation. 
In New York Times, the Court balanced a state's 
interest in protecting the reputation of public officials 
against the vital importance of the free exchange of ideas 
through the media, as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
The Court struck the balance by limiting, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the right of a public official to 
recover from the media for defamatory stories relating to 
his or her official conduct. 
To afford the "breathing space" necessary for free 
and open public debate, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
public official seeking to recover for libel with respect to 
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comments involving his or her official conduct must prove 
that the statements were made with "actual malice." 
The Constitutional guarantees require, we 
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with "actual malice" — that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not. 
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280-81. 
The purpose of the New York Times actual malice 
test is to reduce media self-censorship and to encourage 
public discussion concerning the conduct of public 
officials. The New York Times Court believed that under the 
common law of defamation then in existence, the media would 
not disseminate important stories about public officials for 
fear of constantly being called into court to defend libel 
and slander suits. Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 
971 (Utah 1981). 
For the New York Times standard to apply, the 
plaintiff must be a public official, and the defamatory 
statements must relate to his or her official conduct. See, 
New York Times, 376 U.S.'at 283, n.23; Gray v. Udevitz, 656 
F.2d 588, 590-91 (10th Cir. 1981); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. 
Supp. 987, 989 (N.D. Tenn. 1981). The rule is not limited 
to high ranking public officials. Following the New York 
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Times decision, the Supreme Court, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
386 U.S. 75 (1966), discussed the criteria for identifying a 
public official for purposes of the law of libel. 
In Rosenblatt, a defamation case involving a 
county recreation area supervisor, the Court taught that the 
"designation applies at the very least to those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the 
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control 
over the conduct of governmental affairs." jEd. at 85. The 
Court also stated that the designation applies to those 
whose "position in government has such apparent importance 
that the public has an independent interest in the 
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, 
beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and 
performance of all government employees. . . ." .Id. at 
86. It must appear that the plaintiff's position "would 
invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding 
it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion" 
provoked by the alleged defamation. _Id. at 87, n.13. 
In the twenty-five years since the decision in New 
York Times was rendered, numerous courts, both state and 
federal, have faced the issue of whether a police officer is 
a public official for purposes of the New York Times 
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standard. The overwhelming majority of cases found that a 
police officer is a public official as a matter of law. 
Beginning with St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 
(1968), the Supreme Court has consistently upheld decisions 
of state and federal courts that a police officer is a 
public official. In St. Amant, the Louisiana courts held 
that a deputy sheriff, who had initiated the defamation 
action, was a public official. The Louisiana courts, with 
the subsequent approval of the Supreme Court, applying the 
test established in Rosenblatt, concluded that a deputy 
sheriff has "substantial responsibility for or control over 
the conduct of governmental affairs, . . . at least where 
law enforcement and police functions are concerned." St. 
Amant, 390 U.S. at 730, n.2. 
A later Supreme Court decision held that a Deputy 
Chief of Detectives of the Chicago Police Department was a 
public official by virtue of his position. Time, Inc. v. 
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284, reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 1015 
(1971). In that case, as here, the allegedly defamatory 
statement concerned the actions of a police officer 
performing his duties. 
Very early in the development of the New York 
Times rule, the Supreme Court of Illinois had occasion to 
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apply the definition of public official in Coursey v. 
Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 111. 2d 257, 239 
N.E.2d 837 (1968). There, a former patrolman sought damages 
for allegedly libelous statements in a newspaper story 
concerning the officer's improper conduct while on duty. 
The Illinois Court relied upon Rosenblatt to supply the 
following rationale for its ruling that a cop on the beat is 
a public official: 
It is our opinion that the plaintiff is within 
the "public official" classification. 
Although as a patrolman he is "the lowest in 
rank of police officials" and would have 
slight voice in setting departmental policies, 
his duties are peculiarly "governmental" in 
character and highly charged with the public 
interest. It is indisputable that law 
enforcement is a primary function of local 
government and that the public has a far 
greater interest in the qualifications and 
conduct of law enforcement officers, even at, 
and perhaps especially at, an "on the street" 
level than in the qualifications and conduct 
of other comparably low-ranking government 
employees performing more proprietary 
functions. The abuse of a patrolman's office 
can have great potentiality for social harm; 
hence, public discussion and public criticism 
directed towards the performance of that 
office cannot constitutionally be inhibited by 
threat of prosecution under State libel laws. 
Id. at 841. 
In 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to 
reconsider its decision in Coursey. The court re-examined 
the issue and found its previous holding to be analytically 
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sound and completely consistent with the case law of 
virtually every other jurisdiction in the country. Reed v. 
Northwestern Publishing Co., 530 N.E.2d 474, (111. 1988). 
The Reed court found it significant that in the twenty-year 
interval since the Coursey decision, no court in the country 
had reached a contrary result, Id. at 480, and that the only 
cases which did not apply an actual malice standard involved 
those where the libelous statements were unrelated to the 
officer's official conduct. See, e.g., Tilton v. Cowles 
Publishing Co., 70 Wash. 2d. 707 459 P.2d 8 (1969); Tucker 
v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965); Himango v. Prime Time 
Broadcasting, Inc., 37 Wash. App. 259, 680 P.2d 432 
(1984). The Illinois Court held that in the absence of any 
indication that the plaintiff patrolman did not perform the 
ordinary and customary duties of a beat police officer, it 
was appropriate for the trial judge to determine he was a 
public official. Reed, 530 N.E.2d at 481. 
The Illinois Court also found the reasoning in 
Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1981), to be 
particularly insightful. In Gray, a former policeman brought 
a libel action claiming a newspaper story about his conduct 
as an officer was defamatory. The court reasoned: 
The cop on the beat is the member of the 
department who is most visible to the 
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public. He possesses both the authority and 
the ability to exercise force. Misuse of his 
authority can result in significant 
deprivation of constitutional rights and 
personal freedoms, not to mention bodily 
injury and financial loss. The strong public 
interest in ensuring open discussion and 
criticism of his qualifications and job 
performance warrant[s] the conclusion that he 
is a public official. 
Gray, 656 F.2d at 591. The court found the patrolman was a 
public official andf thus, required to show with "clear and 
convincing proof" that the defamatory statements published 
by the newspaper were made with actual malice. Ld. at 590. 
Thuma v. Hearst Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 
1972), involved a defamation action brought by a police 
captain after a shooting incident tragically similar to the 
shooting death of Clemente Garcia. In Thuma, the family of 
a 16-year-old boy called the police after the boy had 
behaved violently and the family had become frightened for 
the boy and for themselves. Plaintiff Thuma shot the boy 
when he was seen running from his backyard to the front of 
his home. The newspaper defendant had published two 
articles concerning the shooting. Each of the articles 
quoted a reference by the boy's father to the shooting as 
"cold-blooded murder." Id. at 868. 
The trial court granted the newspaper's motion for 
summary judgment. It was clear to the court that Thuma was 
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a public official within the meaning of New York Times. The 
court also found it significant that, as in this case, the 
shooting was a matter of great public interest. 
The incident was a particularly tragic 
one. . . . Thus, entirely apart from the 
issue of whether the shooting was justified, 
there were elements of personal tragedy which 
were of themselves of interest to the reading 
public, and which might not have been present 
had [the boy] died under different 
circumstances. Under those circumstances, the 
father's reaction was itself a matter of 
public interest. 
Id. at 872. In granting the motion, the court held that the 
articles, and the statements therein, could not be penalized 
under the standards of New York Times where a reasonable 
jury could not find that the statements had been published 
with actual malice. Id. 
The Florida Supreme Court, in Smith v. Russell, 
456 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1984), used similar reasoning as the 
Gray and Coursey courts when it held police officers are 
public officials. The court wrote: 
The plaintiff is a highly visible 
representative of government authority who has 
power over citizens and broad discretion in 
the exercise of that power. There are 
probably no public employees more recognizable 
than armed uniformed police officers. Most 
citizens are interested [in police officers1 
qualifications] beyond their general interest 
in the qualifications and performance of all 
government employees. 
Id. at 464. 
The reasoning of the Maine Supreme Court is also 
persuasive. In Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757 (Me. 1981), a 
police detective brought a libel action against six of his 
neighbors who signed a letter requesting that he be 
restricted from carrying a weapon to his residence because 
he had a violent temper, threatened little children, and 
kicked pets. In finding that the plaintiff was a public 
official for purposes of the New York Times standard, the 
court observed: 
Law enforcement is a uniquely 
governmental affair. The police detective, as 
one charged with investigating crimes and 
arresting the criminal, is in fact, and also 
is generally known to be, vested with 
substantial responsibility for the safety and 
welfare of the citizenry in areas impinging 
most directly and intimately on daily 
living: the home, the place of work and of 
recreation, the sidewalks and streets. The 
nature and extent of the responsibility of a 
police detective is punctuated by the fact 
that a firearm, no less than a badge, comes 
with his office. 
Our research has disclosed that every 
court that has faced the issue had decided 
that an officer of law enforcement, from 
ordinary patrolman to Chief of Police, is a 
"public official" within the meaning of 
federal constitutional law. 
Roche, 433 A.2d at 762 (emphasis added). 
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Numerous other courts have consistently recognized 
that police officers are vested with great responsibility 
andf concurrent with that responsibility, such tremendous 
power over our daily lives that they fall within the 
classification of public official for defamation purposes. 
See, e.g. , Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (city 
police chief); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & 
Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1985) (patrolman claims 
defamation arising from report that local liquor laws were 
not enforced); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 
1985) (former patrolman brought defamation claim after 
report of illegal conduct); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 
343 (7th Cir. 1977) (federal drug enforcement agent sues a 
civil rights complainant for statements made during a press 
conference); Karr v. Townsend, 606 F. Supp. 1121 (W.D. Ark. 
1985) (former deputy sheriff complains sheriff libeled him 
at time of termination); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987 
(M.D. Tenn. 1981) (state highway patrolman's action for 
story claiming he was seen urinating while on duty); 
Ethridge v. North Mississippi Communications, Inc., 460 F. 
Supp. 347 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (undercover narcotics agent); 
Hall v. Rogers, 490 A.2d 502 (R.I. 1985) (news story accused 
police officers of irregularities and nepotism); McNabb v. 
-21-
Oregonian Publishing Co., 69 Or. Appo 136, 685 P.2d 458 
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); Koch v. 
Laborico, 66 Or. App. 78, 674 P.2d 602 (1983) (police 
sergeant who was day shift operational supervisor of 
dispatchers alleged comments in a complaint by a civilian 
employee to union alleging professional incompetence was 
defamatory); Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 
161 (Me. 1983) (report implicated patrolman in scheme to 
cheat on promotion exam); Jurkowski v. Crawley, 637 P.2d 56 
(Okla. 1981) (chief of police claimed story accusing him of 
criminal conduct was defamatory); McClain v. Arnold, 275 
S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (patrolman claims injury 
from article reporting allegations of complaint for false 
arrest); Rosales v. City of Eloy, 122 Ariz. 134, 593 P.2d 
688 (1979) (story claiming police sergeant had been charged 
with a crime); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306 (La. 1978) 
(acting chief of police brought action for story depicting 
him as accepting payoffs from barroom proprietors and 
gamblers); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1977) 
(deputy sheriff and police officers brought defamation 
action arising out of allegation that they had made 
attempted illegal entry); Colombo v. Times-Argus Assoc, 
Inc. , 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d 80 (1977) (news report that a 
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police officer distributed a police photo of a nude 
"streaker"); Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 157 W. Va. 
447, 201 S.E.2d 911 (1974) (municipal police sergeant 
inaccurately reported jailed on bad check charges); Moriarty 
v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d 326 (1972) (policeman 
claimed letter published in newspaper accusing him of 
brutality was defamatory); Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 
(Del. 1971) (police sergeant charged with excessive force); 
Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 
1968) (report that detective captain had refused to arrest a 
known child molester); Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 
186 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1982) (patrolman claiming story about 
issuing parking tickets while patrol car was double parked 
was defamatory); Gilligan v. King, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. 
Ct. 1965) (action based upon "Wanted for Murder" poster 
which pictured a police lieutenant). 
Even the cases relied upon by Madsen in his brief 
do not disagree with the decisions of all these courts. 
Madsen has not cited any case in which a policeman of any 
rank was held not to be a public official in a defamation 
action concerning stories reported by the media about the 
policeman in his capacity as a policeman. Madsen cites 
Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965); but, even that 
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case acknowledged that the alleged defamatory material did 
not concern the plaintiff's position as a policeman. The 
court wrote: "That Kilgore was a policeman, however, was no 
more than a coincidental circumstance in the attack made 
upon him by the [alleged defamer]. That attack was directed 
not at Kilgore1s official conduct as a policemanf but at his 
fitness and character as a man. . . . " Id. at 116. 
Madsen similarly relies upon Price v. Viking 
Penguiny Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Minn. 1988), a case 
brought by an FBI agent against an author and book publisher 
claiming he was defamed by statements made in a book in 
connection with events at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1973 
and the killing of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation in 1975. That court, however, held that the FBI 
agent was a public official for purposes of the New York 
Time standard and wrote: 
The public has an interest in learning about 
law enforcement responses to crises and 
emergencies . . . . 
Id. at 1512. 
In Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52 (Utah 1983), this 
Court construed Rosenblatt to require a two-step analysis to 
determine when a plaintiff in a defamation suit is a public 
official so as to trigger the constitutional privilege. 
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First/ the defamed individual must occupy a position which 
invites public scrutiny. Second/ the defamatory comment 
must relate to his or her conduct in that position. I^d. a 
55. 
In that case, the Director of Financial Aids at 
Weber State College brought a defamation action when KUTV 
broadcast stories in which women students alleged they were 
sexually molested by the Director. Despite Van Dyke's 
opposition/ this Court found that the Director of Financial 
Aids at a public institution was a public official. 
Applying the first part of the Van Dyke test/ it 
is plain that Madsen is a government employee in a position 
that both invites and requires public scrutiny. Most 
citizens view police officers as the very epitome of 
government and the public has an important and independent 
interest in the qualification and performance of patrolmen 
such as Madsen whose every day decision-making potentially 
affects the liberty and safety of all citizens. The first 
part of the Van Dyke test has been met in this case. 
Moreover/ as noted abovef other courts faced with this same 
issue have consistently found police officers to be public 
officials for purposes of the New York Times malice 
standard. 
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The second aspect of the Van Dyke test is whether 
the so-called defamatory comments related to Madsen's 
official conduct. They did. Officer Madsen's status as a 
policeman during the period discussed in the television 
broadcast is undisputed. In all of his actions, Madsen was 
clothed in the authority of Salt Lake City. All the alleged 
defamatory statements made in the broadcasts concerned the 
propriety of Madsen's official conduct and his record as a 
law enforcement officer. Even Madsen does not claim that 
the stories concerned his private affairs. The reports were 
not unprotected personal attacks upon Madsen. Rather the 
statements were matters of public interest related to 
Madsen's role in the killing and his performance as a police 
officer. If a minor administrator at a state college is a 
public official, certainly a police officer whose sole 
function is to enforce governmental authority must also be a 
"public official." 
The actions of a patrolman invite public scrutiny 
because the patrolman is the government official most 
visible to the public. As the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained in Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d at 591, the 
strong public interest in insuring open discussion and 
criticism of a police officer's qualifications and job 
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performance warrant the conclusion that he is a public 
official. 
The community has a significant interest in having 
access to information that concerns the use of deadly force 
against a citizen by its police officers and the performance 
record of those entrusted to enforce the law. Accordingly, 
coverage of the shooting incident that left a man dead at 
the hands of a public servant does relate to Madsenfs 
official conduct, thereby satisfying the second step of the 
Van Dyke analysis. 
VII. 
MADSEN IS A "PUBLIC FIGURE" 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that a 
public official's interest in his or her reputation was 
subordinated to the First Amendment interest in promoting 
the free flow of information to the public through the 
media. This policy was subsequently extended by the Supreme 
Court to cases involving "public figures." Consequently, 
public figures must likewise allege and prove actual malice 
in order to prevail on a defamation claim against a media 
defendant. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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The general criteria for defining the term "public 
figure" were established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Courts view "public figures" as being 
in either of two basic categories: (1) those persons who 
have attained an especial prominence in the affairs of 
society and thus assume a "public figure" role 
involuntarily; and (2) those persons who have thrust 
themselves to the forefront of public controversies in order 
to affect the outcome of those controversies. 
In order to trigger the public figure conditional 
privilege, it is not necessary that Madsen be a public 
figure for all purposes. The law recognizes public figures 
for limited purposes. Persons treated as public figures for 
limited purposes are sometimes called "vortex public 
figures" because even though they are not pervasive public 
figures, such as actors and other prominent persons, they 
have voluntarily or involuntarily been injected into a 
specific controversy of public interest. While these 
persons are only considered to be public figures for a 
specific controversy, they are nevertheless genuine public 
figures for all matters related to that particular 
controversy. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351. 
-28-
M a d s e 11 11 J t H t • i i i 111 i'' i n i i " n1 f p MI t i n 11 MI I I I e 
commer- ma*^ G e r t z , tnat " [ p ] u b i i c . i L L i d i S a ^ ; j_ . ^ 
f .- v M ! *ar.4 • ! - ^ • ^- ~ < * . — 
channe i s or e*.i tn. •_. r- joiruiu*: ^a*. . 
r e a l i s - M ^ r - o ^ - p i 1 M e r a c t f , 3- ^ ' a t e m e n c s M-MM 
private indi ao u. . 
M4 -'.we • -legre*- * -jcces . - /.** ^pil ia i s n<~ ^^ 
r 
AS the . . i , . s r-or **
 : vet- . __ 
Northwestern Pubiishinq * 
[A]cess
 t.. * , ~~ . - - ,• 
determining whether a person it -ui -: 
official, bjt is merely an advantage enjoyed 
by many public officials. As noted by Justice 
Powell in Gertz, "11 is ~:tei _: je :r.s; * * 
all of the considerations which justify 
adoption of a given rule will obtain in each 
parH^i'^r rase decided under its authority." 
Reedy 530 \.£_A.i a! ^ ions nrn; 
Madsen a s s o r t s -«* '- *. •* Msraiiiq :i 41 ^omrunity 
t h a t V . • iTievaxa ^' . \-<M"'S-
stories ccrcprn.no * per tumia:^. - P^inan. 1-
:eedmcM "• • "- "' ferp<: " e'.dence supper4-
this unreasonui • ^  - M-
whatsoeve . nc /jrp ^ 1 MI - : ^ctc^ ,. * ; 
media. *- • . : *^i: *ar r-c or 
implying tra^ - -. if je^ .^ '.: -
- -29-
media channels. In fact, it would be absurd for this Court 
to assume that had Madsen decided to contact the media 
concerning his participation in the fatal shooting of 
Clemente Garcia, that he would not have been heard. 
The pivotal question is whether or not a person 
has voluntarily or involuntarily become involved in a matter 
attracting public interest. In Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment when it found that a 
plaintiff in a defamation action was a public figure and 
thus required to prove actual malice. In that case, a 
retail meat company, which had launched an intensive 
advertising campaign in support of a meat sale, brought a 
defamation action against a consumer interest reporter and a 
television station. The court found the plaintiff steak 
company was not a public figure for all purposes. However, 
the steak company "so thrust itself into the purview of the 
Pittsburgh area public that the company can be characterized 
as a public figure for purposes of this litigation." Id,, at 
273.. See also, Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(dean of law school public figure for accreditation 
controversy); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d 
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v. Standard-Examiner Pubishing Co. , H i Ut ah 1» L , 71 P. " L 
(1933); Spielberg v. A. Kuhn & Bro., 39 Utah 276, 116 P. 
1027 (1911) and Utah statutes, Utah Code Ann. §45-2-3 & -10 
(1988). In Utah, this privilege has been recognized and 
referred to as the "Public Interest Doctrine." See 
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981). 
In Seegmiller, this Court held that the public 
interest privilege exists when the defamatory statements 
concern public health, safety and education: 
The "public interest" privilege is 
applicable, at least, when the public health 
and safety are involved and when there is a 
legitimate issue with respect to the 
functioning of governmental bodies, officials, 
or public institutions or with respect to 
matters involving the expenditure of public 
funds. 
Id. 626 P.2d at 978. Like the privileges applied to public 
officials or public figures, the public interest privilege 
is a conditional or qualified privilege. "Of course the New 
York Times standard of malice would have to be proved in any 
event if the plaintiff were a public official or public 
figure, but we do not mean to imply that the public interest 
privilege is limited to such instances." Ld. at 978-79. 
The privilege applies to statements made about 
matters of public safety, such as the violent conduct of 
armed police officers. It can only be overcome by proof 
that the statements were either made with knowledge that 
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record is a matter of public interest, so must be the 
performance and safety record of a police officer. 
The defamatory comments supposedly made by United 
Television in this instance were contained in a news 
broadcast reporting on Madsen's actions as a government 
official/ and these statements involved a matter of 
significant public interest. When a patrolman and public 
servant is responsible for the death of another citizen, it 
concerns all members of the community. The issue of public 
safety is of the highest concern when it regards the 
rational behavior of police officers. 
The shooting death of Clemente Garcia naturally 
engendered substantial interest and concern about a 
legitimate issue involving public health and safety. United 
Television is entitled to invoke the "public interest11 
privilege. More importantly, Madsen's claim that the 
alleged defamatory statements were negligently made is 
insufficient to overcome the "public interest" privilege. 
The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor 
of United Television on Madsen's First Cause of Action. 
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Id. at 561 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986). 
Madsen, relying on Nash v. Keene Publishing Corpf 
127 N.H. 214, 498 A.2d 348 (N.H. 1985), argues it is not for 
the trial court, but rather for the jury, to determine 
whether or not Madsen is a public official or a public 
figure. That, however, is not the rule to be followed 
pursuant to either the United States Constitution or Utah 
law. Even the Nash court acknowledged that Mthe New 
Hampshire rule . . . that the determination of a public 
official or public figure status is a jury question" is an 
"unusual" rule. Icl. at 353. 
Whether or not a plaintiff in a defamation suit is 
a public official for purposes of determining if the New 
York Times standard applies can not be done by reference to 
state law standards. Rather, the determination must be made 
according to the constitutional standards established by the 
United States Supreme Court. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. at 84. Contrary to the "unusual" New Hampshire rule, 
the Rosenblatt court specifically held that "it is for the 
trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the 
proofs show respondent to be a 'public official.1" I_d. at 
88. In Rosenblatt, the Supreme Court explained that "[s]uch 
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the court in Reed v. Northwestern Publishing Co, 124 111. 2d 
495, 530 N.E.2d 474 (1988): 
Although we do not question that there may 
well be governmental employees whose positions 
require the extensive "fact intensive 
analysis" which plaintiff requests, the United 
States Supreme Court clearly does not require 
this with respect to those government 
positions the duties of which are widely 
recognized. Indeed, in the landmark decision 
of New York Times, the court relied not on a 
detailed exposition of the plaintiff's duties, 
but on the fact that his duties are generally 
the supervision of certain city departments. 
Id. at 481. 
In this instance, Madsen's status as a police 
officer involved in a highly publicized killing is 
sufficient to allow the trial court to determine that the 
constitutional privileges apply. As one court has written: 
[S]imply speaking, the status of a public 
official may be deemed sufficient to warrant 
application of the New York Times privilege, 
not because of the government employee's place 
on the totem pole, but because of the public 
interest in a government employee's activity 
in a particular context. 
McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124, 125 
(1980). Here, summary judgment on the negligence claim was 
appropriate. The facts are not in dispute. Madsen's status 
as public official, a public figure and an individual 
involved in a matter of great public interest require, as a 
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applied. 
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